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Abstract
Among the concepts of perfect equilibrium used in the literature
are: i) subgame perfection; ii) trembling-hand perfection; iii) proper-
ness; and iv) perfection. In this note, they are interpreted, compared,
and extended to: games with chance players; arbitrary notions of "large
mistakes"; and in the case of perfection, games without perfect recall.

An Exaainatlon of the General Concept of Perfection
For several years, game theorists have been concerned that the Nash
Equilibriiun solution concept may be at once too strong and too weak, to
provide a satisfactory model of behavior in noncooperative games. It has
been accused of being too strong on the grounds that it relies on an im-
plicit model of how a particular game is played that has very little to
do with the game. In particular, the rationality assumptions underlying
the concept are quite strong, and provide no room for "insurance" that
players may wish to make against each other. On the other hand, in many
games the set of Nash Equilibria is too large to be of much use, as in
the supergame without discounting, where any feasible payoff that gives
each player his mlnmax level (or more) is an equilibrium payoff. These
are not really contradictory criticisms, since the strength of the as-
sumptions required to support equilibrium behavior does not seem quite
so extreme when there is an unique equilibrium.
More focused versions of these general criticisms have concentrated
on the structure of equilibrium strategy combinations. For example, in
the context of an extensive-form game, it is possible for equilibrium
behavior to be secured by wholly incredible threats. Also, equilibrium
behavior has only the weakest stability properties: while each person
Is content to follow the equilibrium prescription as long as the others
do so, there is no guarantee that a small deviation on the part of one
of the players, whether by accident or design, will not be followed by
large deviations on the part of all the others.
To address these and similar criticisms, a number of refinements of
the equilibrium concept have been developed. The origins of these
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refined versions, and even their recent history, are quite diffuse, and
they have gone by different names. However, perhaps the best-known line
of development is that initiated by Selten in a series of papers which
provide the general rubric of perfection for several equilibrium-based
notions with additional properties.
In this essay, we examine the substance of these modifications, and
obtain extensions of two of the perfection concepts to general games.
The plan is as follows: in Section I, we describe three concepts on
which perfection notions are based: backwards induction; subgame per-
fection; and trembling-hand perfection. Section II lays out the
extensive- and normal-form models we shall use, and Introduces some
notation. Section III discusses the perfection notions that have ap-
peared in the literature, and Section IV introduces the extensions to
general games (with chance moves and without perfect recall).
I. Intuitive Bases for Perfection
A. Backwards Induction
In one of the first major papers on the theory of games, Zermelo
proved that all finite games of perfect information (with no chance moves)
have optimal strategies. The method of proof was constructive, in that
it provided an explicit procedure whereby such equilibria (combinations
of optimal strategies) could be calculated. Starting from each endpoint,
one merely worked backwards through the tree, deciding at each stage what
the player whose move it was would do. Thus, if player i was the last to
move along a particular play of the game, his choice can be determined
by comparing the i elements of the payoff vectors associated with the
endpoints that player i could have selected. For almost all games, this
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will yield a unique choice, which we can use to eliminate this last move.
In other words, since we know what the last player will do in each case,
we can shorten the tree by one move along each branch. The penultimate
player is now the last player, and we repeat the process until there are
no moves left in the game. The choices we derived along the way consti-
tute the equilibrium strategies.
This method of solution is very appealing, when it works. The reason
is that it represents a calculation which each player can (and will) make
in precisely the same way, so there is no need to invoke any mechanism
of communication or commitment outside the game in order to implement or
justify a solution. All that is required is the minimal rationality
postulate that players act to maximize their own payoffs, plus the con-
dition that this behavioral fact is common knowledge.
The problem is that it is very easy for this mechanism to fail. For
example, even in a game of perfect information, it may happen that one
player does not have a unique choice at a particular vertex. In other
words, there may be several choices which offer the same prospective
payoff, so that the player who has to choose is indifferent between the
two choices. It may also be the case that the other players are not in-
different, but they cannot predict which, if any of them will be favored
by the move of the indecisive player. This does not impair the existence
of an equilibrium, since we can proceed with the backwards induction
given any assumption about what the player will do, and we can then cal-
culate that player's best response in terms of the strategies thus de-
rived for the whole game. However, the player's choice at the particular
vertex then takes on the nature of a threat or a promise
,
and is therefore
somewhat less compelling.
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Also, if perfect information fails, we may not be able to carry out
the backwards induction for the simple reason that Informational con-
straints on the later players may make it impossible to predict their
final choices without knowledge of the earlier moves of the other players.
The following two examples show these two failures of backwards induction:
Fig. 1 Failure of B.I. due to nonuniqueness of choice
( iDjio)
Si.
^-^ i I J to)
Fig. 2 Failure of B.I. due to bad information
The examples are self-evident, so their explanation is left as an
exercise.
B. Subgame Perfection
What we saw in the backwards induction was a situation where each
player was able to predict his own and others' moves at each subsequent
vertex of the tree. In order for this to happen, it was important that
each player be able to act independently at each vertex. In more general
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games, where perfection information does not necessarily obtain, we can
nonetheless isolate certain situations, called subgames , which have (or
are defined by) the property that players can select their actions in the
subgaae independently of those selected in the rest of the game. Under
this restriction, it is sensible to ask that players employ equilibrium
strategies in each subgame. This is one definition of credible behavior;
a threat or promise is credible if, given what the player proposing the
threat or promise knows about the reactions of the other players, this
action will actually be carried out if need arises. Of course, this is
not the only possible standard for credible behavior in subgames that
the game will not reach, but it has the virtue of consistency; since we
are assuming Nash equilibrium behavior for the game. It would seem reason-
able to impose it in the subgames. The principal objection to this line
of reasoning is the following: if a player reaches a subgame that should
not have been reached according to the declared strategies, this must
mean that one or more players failed to carry out their declared plans.
Why should a player in such a situation believe that they will continue
to adhere to the rest of their strategies? Equilibrium arguments tell
us that it is in their best interests to do so, but if selfish interest
has already proven to be a bad predictor . . .?
However, the basis of the subgame reasoning is as described: it is
important that all players be able to agree on the subgames, so that
each can confidently form (equilibrium-type) expectations about the be-
havior of the others; moreover, within each subgame, the strategies of
the players must be consistent with equilibrium behavior. To have faith
in such equilibria, we must again stress that all players must agree on
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what the subgames are, so that they can anticipate each other's moves
correctly. Finally, we note that the concept of rationality that is
being invoked here is fairly strong; it has all the strength of Nash
Equilibrium, where each player assumes that the other players are also,
going to play according to the Nash theory, plus the additional require-
ment that the players assume that they will all continue to adhere to
these conjectures even in the face of factual evidence to the contrary.
[NB: it may be felt that we have characterized the rationality require-
ments of Nash Equilibrium unfairly—we would beg the reader to remember
that in general, players do not have the opportunity to re-evaluate their
strategy choices in light of the choices of their opponents, so that
.
Nash-rationality must be inherently prospective.]
C . Trembling Hand Perfection
Another approach to the problem of perfection is based on the idea
that players may not be certain as to the other players' ability to carry
out planned moves without making any mistakes. If a player believes that
there is some small but positive probability that other players will make
some other moves, then it behooves that player not to rely too heavily
on their declared moves. This way of playing the game is therefore based
on a model of small mistakes on the part of the other players. It is in
some ways a more appealing intuitive concept than subgame perfection,
since it involves less inference by each player about the rationality of
the others: since each player uses the declared strategies of the others
as the basis for his expectations, but explicitly allows for the possi-
bility of mistakes, discovering that a mistake has in fact been made
should come as less of a shock. Moreover, it is not necessary to work
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out what the set of subganes are that everyone can agree upon, since
each player is only interested in what the other players do , and not at
all in why they do it. On the other hand, the technical aspects of the
definition produce an additional restriction; while we have in mind that
an equilibriun is trembling hand perfect if it is a limit of equilibria
calculated for games where players are unable to expect their opponents
to do exactly what they said they were going to do, the way the definition
is worded suggests that this perfection can be invoked if there exists a
single sequence of "models of mistakes" that has the desired property,
not that convergence should hold for all such models.
One particular kind of model would admit the possibility of mistakes,
but would not have them be wholly random. For example, we might require
that the probability of a person making a particular kind of mistake
should be proportional to (or at least an increasing function of) the
profitability of the mistake. Since this requirement disallows some of
the models of mistakes we were able to invoke for perfection, this leads
to a strictly stronger concept, which has been called propemess . Another
model which seems appropriate when strategies are chosen from separable
metric spaces, would restrict attention to sutiations where "large" mis-
takes are assigned lower probabilities than "small" mistakes. This is
merely another way of defining the concept of properness, however, if the
payoff functions are jointly continuous in all the strategies. The sit-
uations where the two concepts diverge tend to be those extensive-form
games where the topology that is natural is imposed separately at each
information set. In such situations, the payoff function for the game
may, given the strategies of the other players, be a discontinuous
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function of the choice at any particular information set, especially if
mixed strategies are ruled out.
D. General Perfection
The strongest perfection concepts are an amalgam of the subgame and
trembling hand ideas, although they are most easily explained in terms of
subgame-type thinking. The basic idea is that each player faces several
independent decision situations during a game. A decision situation is
a collection of information sets which are independent of other informa-
tion sets by virtue of perfect recall, and which are linked to one another
by failures of perfect recall. For instance, each information set in a
game of perfect recall represents an independent decision situation. The
requirement is that each player, in each independent decision situation,
should make a "local best reply", - which is to say that each player should
choose an optimum in the decision problem obtained by filling in the de-
clared strategies of the other players, and of the particular player under
consideration at other independent decision situations. There is an im-
portant difference between this notion and subgame perfection, and it
comes from the fact that we no longer require all the players to share
the same set of independent decision situations. This is a subtle point,
and worth making carefully. When we say that a player takes the actions
of all other players, including himself at other decision situations, as
given, we are putting him in a conceptual framework that is closely akin
to the Nash Equilibrium framework. It is not that the concerned players
play each game separately, and obey simultaneity within each subgame.
Rather, all subgames are considered at one time, and the selection of
each part of a player's strategy is subject to the same ex post stability
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requirements (i.e., best response) as the strategy as a whole. To put
it slightly differently: in subgame perfection the notion of Nash
Equilibrium is used repeatedly, at each subgame. For general perfection,
it is used only once, but on a very disaggregated version of the game;
each player being split into his independent "personalities" or agents
,
who are bound to each other only by the fact that they share the same
payoff function.
II. Extensive- and Normal-form Models
,
Preliminary Definitions
We begin with the definition of a game in extensive form. We remark
that these models all conform to standard usage; for further details,
the reader is referred to referenced work by Kuhn and by Luce and Raiffa.
2.1 Definition ; An extensive-form game is a collection T = [K,N,5,h,p],
where:
N is the (finite) set of players ;
K is the game tree
, consisting of vertices and choices at each
vertex;
H = [E^,...,H ] is the information structure ; if we denote by
K those vertices of K at which the chance player moves,
and by W the set of endpoints of K (vertices for which the
set of choices is empty), then H is a partition of K-K^-W.
Each H. = [U. , . .
.
,U
, . . . ] , where U is called an informa-
tion set of player i_, and consists of a set of vertices x
with the following properties:
i) the number of choices at each x is the same;
ii) player i has to choose at each x;
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iii) when player i chooses, he must do so in ignorance
of which X he has reached; all he knows is that he
is at one of the vertices in U ; and
iv) there is no vertex x in U with the property that
the (unique) path from the origin through x con-
tains another vertex y in U .
h:W -> R is the payoff function
,
and assigns an n-tuple of pay-
offs to each endpoint;
p is the probability structure ; it describes the way chance
selects moves at vertices in K_. For most purposes, it is
sufficient to treat this as a collection of independent
probability distributions on the choices at each x £ K .
2.2 Definition ; Let x be a vertex of K. Since K is a tree, there is
a unique path from the origin to x; we denote this path x. If y € x,
we say that y > x, or "y comes before x. " This is a transitive relation,
and partially orders the vertices of K. Now define
D(x) = {y e K; x -» y}
this set is called the descendants of x. Among the vertices in D(x) are
vertices y with the property that there is no vertex z s.t.
X -> z -» y
these vertices are called the immediate successors of x, and denoted
I(x). There is a natural isomorphism between the choices at x and the
members of I(x); to any y^ I(x) there corresponds a choice k such that
if k is chosen at x, the next vertex will be y. We say that "y follows
X via the k— choice." We write this as y = I(x,k), and define
D(x,k) = I(x,k) U D(I(x,k))
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This is the set of vertices which follow x via the k— choice. IThen we
are dealing with sets of vertices, such as information sets, we shall
write A > B if there exist x 6 A and y€ B s.t. x -> y. Moreover, we de-
fine D(A) to be U D(x), and D(A,k) = U D(x,k).
X € A X e A
2.3 Definition ; Let n be a partition of H. into elements p , ..., each
of which is a collection of information sets belonging to player i. A
pure p-strategy is a rule which assigns a choice to each information set
in p. A pure H-strategy is a rule which assigns a p-strategy to each
pen. A mixed p-strategy is a random variable whose values are pure
p-strategies, while a mixed Il-strategy is a rule which assigns a mixed
p-strategy to each p S n. Note that it follows that choices may be
correlated between information sets in the same p € n, but must be
independent between elements of IT.
2.4 Remark : This definition is not standard usage, and it may be use-
ful to relate it to standard definitions by taking two examples:
II_ is the coarse partition , it has but a single element, so a
II_-strategy is a mixed strategy , in the usual terminology;
n is the fine partition , each information set being a separate ele-
ment, so a n-strategy is a behavioral strategy .
2.5 Definition : Let n be a partition of H . . We say that player i has
perfect recall w.r.t. n_ if, for any p, p' ^ II, and for any two informa-
tion sets u^ p, v^ p', either
i) V "^ D(u) = = u n D(v), or
ii) if (w.l.o.g.) u f^ D(v) f 0, then uC D(v,k), some k.
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2.6 Remark ; Tnis also differs somewhat from standard usage; in the usual
framework, an agent has perfect recall iff he has perfect recall w.r.t. II.
It will be noted that every agent has perfect recall w.r.t. II_.
2.7 Definition ; Let F be a game in extensive form with no chance moves
[i.e., K„ = 0], We say that agent i has perfect information iff every
information set in 5. consists of exactly one vertex. If every agent has
perfect information, we say that T has perfect information. In a game
with chance moves, we say that agent i has perfect information iff, for
«
every information set u £ H
,
and for every information set vG H.
(where j may be i), we have
V > u^ =» u^ n D(v) C D(v,k)
for some k. An alternative, stronger requirement, is
V -»• u =* u C D(v,k)
for some k.
We shall now define the expected payoff function for an extensive-
form game. Given any n-tuple of pure strategies for the personal [non-
chance] players in F, which we denote by a = [a,,..., a ], and any single
pattern of choices at vertices in K^ (realization of chance moves),
which we shall denote a^, the game will reach a unique endpoint w(a,aQ).
Given any n-tuple of mixed strategies, we can calculate the equivalent
Jl-strategy, which consists of a collection of pure strategies with prob-
abilities for each one. In exactly the same way, we can associate with
any realization of the chance player's moves the probability (given by
p) of its occurrence. For any such collection of choices a by player i,
we shall write pr(a ) for the probability of its occurrence. If we wish
to describe the expected payoff resulting from the use of a particular
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n-tuple of mixed strategies p = [y^,...,u ], we reflect this by writing
the probabilities as pr(a. |vi.). For the chance player, this is denoted
pr(a^|p), since the chance player's strategy is fixed at p. It follows
that the expected payoff is given by:
n
H(y) = E h(w(aQ,a^,...,a^))(pr(0Q[p))( n pr(a |u.))
We now turn to the definition of the normal-form game.
2.8 Definition ; A normal-form game is an assemblage [N,E,h] where
N is the finite set of players ;
E = E, X ... X E is the strategy space (a Cartesian product of
1 n
compact sets of pure strategies ) ; and
h: E ->• R is the payoff function.
2.9 Definition : For each player i in a normal-form game, a mixed
strategy is a E. -valued random variable: it induces probabilities on
E., which allow us to define the expected payoff function , H, in a
manner precisely analogous to the above. For each i, we denote the
space of mixed strategies by M. . As a matter of notation, whenever we
refer to a Cartesian product which includes all the players except for
player i, we shall use the subscript "(i)".
To every extensive form game, 7, and partition 11 = 11 ,...,!! of the
information structure H, there corresponds a normal-form game G(r,n)
defined as follows: the players in G(r,II) are the agents of players in
r, where an agent is a player who controls the choice at a single ele-
ment of n , and has player i's payoff. IVhat is usually denoted "the ~
normal form of T" is here denoted G(r,n).
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2.10 Definition : A strategy y. of player i is said to be dominant in
a^ set B C M . of player i's strategies w.r.t. a_ set A ^ M , . , of_ the other
players' strategies iff, for all V/js ^ A and all pi ^ M.
,
«i<^'^i)) >«i<'^i'^i)>
If the above equation holds with strict inequality for all u! ^ ^^^t we
say that V . is strongly dominant in B^ w.r.t. A^. The set of dominant
strategies in B w.r.t. A is denoted A.(B,A), while the set of strongly
dominant strategies in B w.r.t. A is denoted 5.(B,A) - it is either a
singleton or empty.
A Nash Equilibrium is an n-tuple of strategies u = [ii^,...,u ] with
the property that, for each i,
^i^ V^'^i))
Another way to say this condition is that y, is a best response to
y, V. It will be noted that the set of best responses is the convex
hull of the set of pure-strategy best responses.
III. Perfection Notions from the Literature
A . PI : "Subgame Perfection " £ l£ Selten
We begin with a general definition of a subgame defined by a collec-
tion of vertices. This definition is much more general than we need for
this section, but it will be useful in Section IV, since it precisely
captures the intuition behind subgame perfection.
3.1 Definition : Let T be an extensive-form game, and B a subset of the
vertices of K - W. We say that B^ defines a_ subgame T iff:
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i) for each i and each u
,
[B H D(u.) j^ 0] =* [B C D(u.,k)] sone k;
ii) for each i and u., [u^ n (b U D(B)) ^ 0] => [u C (B U D(B))].
The first condition means that every player in or after B has perfect
recall of the events leading up to B, so that no player must choose a
strategy in the subgame that depends on previous choices. The second
condition says that every player in the subgame is aware of being in the
subgame, so that choices in the subgame can be made independently of
other subgames. We shall return to this definition of a subgame later:
for the moment we limit ourselves to subgames as Selten defined them,
which is to say, subgames in our sense defined by single-element infor-
mation sets . By the tree property, this means that condition i is
trivially satisfied, and we only have to verify condition ii, which can
be interpreted as the requirement that the "subtree" starting from the
information set that defines the subgame does not "cut" any other infor-
mation set, and if v is any other information set s.t. u* + v, we require
that V C D(u*).
3.2 Definition ; Let B define a subgame; we now define
i) N„ = {i: 3. (^ (B "J D(B)) ^ 0}; the set of players in r„;
ii) IC = B U D(B); the "tree " of T (not really a tree, but
a union of trees;
H B
iii) H_ = {H.: ie N„}
,
where each H . = K_, n H
.
; this is well-
is i B 1 D 1
defined by condition 3.1. ii, and is the information
structure for r ;
B
iv) W = rC n W - the set of endpoints of T ;
v) h„ is the restriction of h to W ;
vi) p^ is the restriction of p to K n K ;
o U B
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vii) Z. is the space of player i's pure st rategies in r ; the
i — ^
generic element a. selects a choice at each u. ^ H..^1 1 i
A partition of 5. is said to be B-allowable if, for
B B
each pSji, pi^E j'^'^pCH; of course, II_ is almost
never B-allowable, so we denote the coarsest B-allowable
B B
partition by £ —all of H is a single element. Mixed
_B
jl
-strategies have an independent component which de-
termines the choice at this element, so we call this
«
component a mixed strategy for T_', the space of such is
denoted M.
.
1
3.3 Definition :
i) let {B} be a collection of subsets of K; {B} is proper if
the origin belongs to {B}, and if each B € {B} defines
a subgame;
ii) since we have defined payoffs and strategies for r„, it is
trivial to define dominance for r„, so we have the
symbols: A^(C,A) and 6^(C,A) for C C M^ and A C m,^..
We shall define subgarae perfection with respect to a proper collec-
tion of subsets. Before we do so, however, we need to be certain that
we are dealing with strategies which can be defined for the various sub-
games; since we want the definition to apply to arbitrary _n-strategies,
and since JI is in general not B-allowable, we have to show that there
are equivalent strategies which are H-strategies for a B-allowable II.
3.4 Lemma: Let r„ be defined, and let y be an n-tuple of n~strategies.
D —
T3 R R R
Define II. for each player i as II. = [p..q.]j where
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p^
= {u e H^: u e H^}
B ,_ _B,
H R R R
Let n denote [IT , ..,11 ]. Then there exists an n-tuple of H -strategies
V with the property that v and u induce the same probability distribution
on W: i.e. H(v) = H(u),
Proof : Condition 3.1.i and Kuhn's Theorem.
3.5 Definition ; Let {B} be a proper collection of subsets, and let \i
be an n-tuple of H-strategies. We say that \i is Pl-perfect w.r.t. {B}
iff, for every B S {B}, we have
B ^ ,B,„B B .
^ ^ ^i^"i'^i)>
where u. is the T^ part of the equivalent strategy given by the above
1 a
lemma.
TThat this definition says is that a Pl-perfect n-tuple of strate-
gies w.r.t. {B} is one that induces an equilibrium in every subgame de-
fined by a member of {B}. In case {B} = the set of all single element
information sets that define subgames, we say that the n-tuple strate-
gies is Pl-perfect . In case {B} is the set of all subsets that define
subgames, we say the strategies are P2-perfect .
B . P3 : "Trembling-hand perfection "
This perfection notion is only defined for normal-form games, so to
think of it as a concept for extensive-form games requires that we pass
to a normal form. We remind the reader that this definition can be ap-
plied to any normal form G(r,II) [Def. 2.9], but what we shall denote by
P3 is the application of this definition to G(r, II).
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3.6 Definition ; Let [N,Z,h] be a normal form game, and represent a
mixed strategy for player i by a Borel-measurable map y.: [0,1] "*" 2 ,
.
Such a map defines a measure X°y. , where X is Lebesgue measure. For
convenience, given any measurable map v: [0,1] * E., let us write
X(v) for X^v . Such a measurable map, v, is a:
i) mixed strategy if X(v)(Z.) = 1; and a
ii) minimum probability assignment if X(v)(E.) <^ 1.
3.7 Definition : Let v be a minimum probability assignment. It is said
to be completely mixed iff there exists a Lebesgue integrable function
f: E. -> R s.t.
1
i) f > uniformly on Z ;
ii) for each measurable S C E., /f(a) X(v)(da) = X(v)(S); and
^ S
iii) / f(a)X(v)(do) j< 1.
The set of completely mixed minimum probability assignments is denoted
T.. The cartesian product x T. = T.
ISN ^
3.8 Definition ; Let v G T. We define a normal-form game [N,M(v),H] by
M(v) = X M (v ) where
i^N ^
^
M (v^) = {y^ € M ; for each measurable S, X(u^)(S) >_ X(v^)(S)}
If we think of this as a normal-form game, and of M(v) as a space of
n-tuple of pure strategies, it is fairly easy to show that the game has
equilibria in pure strategies, by compactness and concavity arguments.
These pure-strategy equilibria will be completely mixed strategy n-tuples
for the original game, although they will not always be equilibria.
-19-
3.9 Definition : Let [N,E,h] be a normal-form game, and y S m a Nash
equilibrium. We say that \i is trembling hand perfect iff there exists
a sequence v of members of T with the properties:
1) V ->• in the weak* topology, where is the trivial
member of T;
11) there is a sequence y of members of M s.t.
a) M S M(v ) for each t;
t t t
b) \i . € A (M. (v.),y - . ) for each i; and
>, t
c) \i * y.
We remark that, if supp(y.) denotes the set of pure strategies of
player 1 (members of Z ) that are used with positive probability in y ,
the following properties obtain:
1) if y is a Nash Equilibrium, then, for each 1 and each
a^ € supp(y^), H^(u^),a^) = \(l^(i) » l^i)?
ii) if y is a Nash Equilibrium with the property that, for each
i, supp(y.) = Z., then y is trembling-hand perfect; and
ili) for games with an a priori restriction to pure strategies,
the concepts of equilibrium and trembling-hand perfection
coincide.
One particularly simple class of games is the class of 2x2 games;
those with two players, each of whom has two pure strategies. For such
games, a complete classification can be obtained.
3.10 Theorem : In a 2x2 game exactly one of the following situations
obtains:
1) there is an unique equilibrium [pure or mixed] and it is
trembling-hand perfect;
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ii) there are two equilibria [both pure] , of which only one
is trembling-hand perfect;
iii) there are three equilibria [two pure and one mixed], all of
which are trembling-hand perfect;
iv) there are a continuum of equilibria [semi-pure: one player
uses a pure strategy] of which only one, a pure one, is
trembling-hand perfect.
Proof : We begin by showing that our classification of the equilibrium
sets is correct. The following is a classification of all 2x2 games
according to dominance:
Class I^: both players have strongly dominant strategies;
Class II : one has a strongly dominant strategy; the other has a
Class III : both players have weakly dominant strategies;
Class IV: one has a strongly dominant strategy, the other has
no dominant strategies;
Class V: one has a weakly dominant strategy, the other has no
dominant strategies;
Class VI: neither has any dominant strategies.
The following are the equilibrium sets corresponding to each class:
Class I: unique equilibrium - each player uses his strongly dominant
strategy;
Class II: there are two cases - if the two strategies of the player
with the weakly dominant strategy are equivalent [give the same payoff]
when the other player uses his strongly dominant strategy, then there
are a continuum of equilibria, if not, there is again a unique pure-
strategy equilibrium point;
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Class III: there are four cases - for each player i, we denote that
player's weakly dominant strategy by g. and his other strategy by b .
Case III-l: h^(g^,b2) = h^(b^,b2); h2(bj^,b2) = h2(b^,g2): here
there are two isolated pure-strategy equilibrium points: (b^,b„) and
V S-I jSo '
Case III-2: hj^(g^,b2) = h^(bj^,b2); h2(g^,b2) = h2(g^,g2): here
there are a continuum of equilibria of the form (g^>q) for q € [0,1];
Case III-3: hj^(g^,g2) = h^(b^,g2); h2(b^,b2) = h2(b^,g2): this is
symmetric with III-2, so the equilibria are points of the form (p,g^)
for p G [0,1];
Case HI-4: h^(b^,g2) = hj^(g^,g2); h2(g^,b2) = h2(g^,g2): we get
the set of points which are either of the form (p,g^) or (g, ,q) for p,q
IN [0,1].
Class IV: again, there is a unique pure equilibrium in this class; ,
the player with the strongly dominant strategy uses it, and the other
player uses his best response which is by definition of this class pure.
Class V has two cases, depending on whether the equivalence between
the "b" and "g" strategies of the player with the weakly dominant ["g"]
strategy occurs at a strategy of the other player that is on that
player's best response function. The difference is minor, however, and
in both cases there are a continuum of equilibria which will involve a
mixed strategy by the player with the weakly dominant strategy. In the
second case, where the equivalence of the "b" and "g" strategies occurs
off the other player's best response function, there is an additional,
isolated pure strategy equilibrium, where the first player plays his "g"
strategy as an unique best response.
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Class VI can be most easily analyzed by visualizing the best response
functions of the players. By definition, if these functions are shown in
the unit square, with one axis for the probability used by each player,
each best-response function will connect diagonally-opposed corners [see
discussion infra for pictures]. If they touch different corners, there
is a unique- and completely mixed-equilibrium, while if they connect the
same pair of corners there are three equilibria, one of which is mixed,
while the other two are pure.
In the figures which follow, we have shown the pair of best response
functions for the various cases discussed above. The segment of player
i's best response function labelled S is the segment where the best re-
sponse is (locally - holding the other player's strategy fixed) unique.
Where there are multiple best responses, they are indicated by W..
Equilibria are given by points of intersection between the two best re-
sponse functions, and we note that the following is true:
The intersection of S
^
and S^ is always a trembling-hand perfect equil-
ibrium point. The only other trembling-hand perfect equilibria are
intersections of W and W
^
that are interior to both .
%
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This completes the proof, and our discussion of perfection in the
P3 sense, although we shall return to the subject in the next section.
C. P4: Properness
The term "proper equilibrium" was coined by Myerson to describe a
situation in which the probability of making a given mistake that each
player ascribes to the others is taken to be proportional to its profit-
ability . It is evident that, with such a restriction placed on the
allowable sequences of completely mixed minimum probability assessments,
the sets T from which they can be chosen shrink. As a consequence, the
set of proper equilibria is a subset of the set of perfect equilibria.
If the definition were rephrased so that perfection required convergence
for every sequence of minimum probability assessments, this inclusion
-24-
would be reversed. At any rate, the intuition underlying Myerson's
definition is that "small" mistakes are intuitively more likely than
"large" ones. Of course, the crucial question is then; what do we
mean by a small mistake?
In Myerson's work, a definition is given in terms of the payoff
function: a small mistake is one that gives nearly the same payoff as
what was intended.
3.11 Definition : Let [N,E,h].be a normal form game, and let M be
player i's space of mixed strategies, with H: M -> R being the expected
payoff function. We say that ij ^ h is a proper equilibrium iff there
exist sequences e "^ R , and \i C M° (the interior of M) s.t.
i) for each t, e > 0, and lim e =0;
t-»-oo
ii) for each t, each 1 and each pair a., ol ^ E., we have
' '^ 1 1 1
f^i^^i'^i)' ^ "i^'^i'^i)^^ ^ ^^i^'^i^ ^
^'^ Ui(ap]; and
.... , . tiii) lim n = u.
t-»-oo
In other words, the model of mistakes involved in proper equilibria is
such that inferior pure strategies are given smaller and smaller weight.
Since this is merely a restriction on the sequences of strategies
which can be used to approach a perfect equilibrium, it is clear that
this forms a subset of the set of perfect equilibria.
D. P5: Perfection
This perfection notion is a subgame perfection notion, but it
strengthens the requirements of subgame perfection considerably. As
originally described, it was intended to apply to games with perfect
recall only. The advantage of such games is of course that mixed
-25-
strategies are equivalent to behavioral strategies, so that each infor-
mation set becomes an independent decision situation. The perfection
notion thus arrived at has two definitions: one is essentially that
each player at each information set, taking as given the actions of all
other players, and his ovm actions at all other information sets, is
playing a "local best response". The other is that the strategies are
trembling-hand perfect in the "agent-normal form" G(r,II).
We begin with the first definition: let 3 ^ M be an n-tuple of
behavioral strategies for an extensive-form game T, To be explicit,
we shall represent the strategy space of behavioral strategies as B,
where
B = X B.
iSN ^
B. = X M(u)
and, for any information set u, M(u) is the space of random decisions
at u. For the generic member 3 ^ B, we shall let 3(u) be the induced
probability distribution on choices at u. Given 3, we shall define a
decision problem for _u as follows: the alternatives are members of
M(u), and the payoff to each alternative is denoted H(u|3) and calcu-
lated as follows: let x ^ u. If the game had reached x, and the t
—
alternative were chosen, the next vertex would be I(x,t). From I(x,t),
the choices specified by 3 allow us to calculate a terminal probability
distribution conditional on I(x,t)
,
which we denote v(w,x,t) for an
arbitrary endpoint w S w. The payoff conditional on (x, t) is denoted
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h(x,t) = / h(w) v(dw,x, t). Of course, we do not know which element of u
W
has been reached. However, the information in S can be used to provide
a conditional distribution v(x| g) on the members x G u. This is cal-
culated in a straightforward Bayesian manner, and this requires some
comment. In general, for any vertex x and any mixed strategy p £ M,
we can calculate pr(x| p), the probability of reaching x when the players
are using u. We shall therefore write
v(x B) = P^'^'''^^ = P^^^^l^^ [by an alternative notation]
/pr(y|3)dy /prCdylg)
u u
What may be noticed is that this rule tells us nothing about what to do
when /pr(y|g)dy = pr(u|s), the conditional probability of reaching u
u
given 8, is 0. In other words, if has the property that some infor-
mation sets are unreachable given g, the agents at those information
sets do not face well defined problems.
The payoff function for the decision problem can now be written
explicitly, for those agents who are "active" given g. This set of
agents is denoted A(B) = {u ^ E: pr(u|g) > 0}
.
3.12 Definition : Let u ^ S, g € B, be given. If u € E
.
, and if
y € M(u) is a random choice at u, the expected payoff to
_}j given _g is
denoted 3f (ulg) and calculated as
u '
3f(u|g)=/ / v(x|g)M(t)h.(x,t)dtdx,
""
u T(u) ^
where T(u) is the set of pure choices at u.
Notice that this definition can be adapted to deal with information
structures other than perfect recall; this will be done in Sec. IV.
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3.13 Definition ; g e B is perfect(P5) iff, for each u £ 5, and for
each 3' € M(u), where & = {& : u ^ E} , we have
There is another approach to this concept of perfection. Inasmuch
as the various information sets do constitute Independent agents of the
players, it is possible to form the agent-normal form G(r,n). It turns
out to be the case that trembling-hand perfection in the agent-normal
form is equivalent to P5 perfection [see Selten]
.
IV. Extensions of the Above Concepts
We have essentially three objectives in this section. First, we
shall extend the notion of properness to deal with other possible
topologies on the space of strategies, to see what implications can
be drawn from the notion that "small" mistakes are somehow more likely
than "large" mistakes. Among the points of interest here are: the
different topologies that are reasonable when the normal form is derived
from an extensive form; and the concept of rationality embodied in the
anticipation of mistakes. The second objective is to make precise the
relation between the trerabling-hand and subgame perfection concepts,
and to describe fully the inclusion relations between the various
notions for various classes of games. Finally, we shall extend the
concept of 75 perfection [optlmality at each independent decision prob-
lem] by describing a canonical form of an extensive-form game that
isolates the independent decision problems. There are several ways to
describe this form, each of which adds something to our intuition about
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the reasonableness of perfection as a refinement of the notion of Nash
Equilibrium.
A. Refinements of Properness: different topologies
Since properness derives from trembling-hand concepts, and is
phrased in terms of a particular definition of trembling-hand perfec-
tion, we shall begin by describing eight possible formulations of
trembling-hand perfection, and the relations between them.
We shall work in the context of a normal form game [N,Z,h]. This
is extended to a game [N,M,H] by the use of mixed strategies;
M = X M is the space of mixed strategies; each M is the set of
iGN • ^
E - valued random variables, or probability distributions over I .
1 ^
There are situations where one or the other interpretation is to be
preferred, but we shall blur the distinction here. H is the expected
payoff function. The generic member of E = x Z. is written
i^N
s = [s ,...,s ] while the generic member of M = x M is written
1 " iSN ^
a = [a a 1, and where we denote by a.(s) the probability thatIn 1
s S Z will be used if player i employs the mixed strategy a^.
4.1 Definition ; a* € M is Pa iff there exist sequences c^ C R_^ and
0* C M° [the interior of M = (a S M: for all i, s e E , a (s) > 0}]
t 11
such that
i) e > 0, all t, lim e^. = 0;
ii) lim cr* = a*; and
t->-oo
iii) for all t,j S N, s. S E., if [a*|s.] denotes the strategy
J J J
n-tuple [a*,'.',<3*_,s.,a*,...,a-l^], then
H ([a*|s.]) < max {H.([a*|s])} implies a*(s ) £ (0,e ).
J J s6E. J ' ^
J
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4.2 Definition : a* € M is Pb iff for every sequence e C r
[s.t. £ -»• 0] there exists a sequence a* C m° s.t. i-iii above obtain.
4.3 Definition ; a* S m is P£ iff there exists a sequence n^ of maps
r\ :Z ->• (0,1) and a sequence a* c: >{"» s.t.
iv) for all i ^ N, t and s G I "n (s) > 0, and lim 'n^is) = 0;
ii) [as above] ; and
v) for each t,j e N, s e Z
., H ([a*|s ]) < max {H.([a*|s])}
£ J J J ggj. _ J
implies a*(s .)
€
(0, n (s .)
)
^
t J t J
4.4 Definition : a* £ M is Pd iff for all sequences r\ of naps
n : Z * (0,1) s.t. for all j, s € S ., lim n^(s) = 0, there exists a
sequence a* C M° such that ii) and v) are satisfied.
4.5 Definition ; a* G M is Pe iff there exists a sequence e C R and
a sequence a* CM" s.t. i), ii), and
vi) if M(e ) denotes {a G U: for all i, s G E , a(s) > & },
then for each i G N, and each t G M (e ),
a) 0* e M(ej.), and
b) H^(a*) > H^([a*|T.])
[in words, for each t, a* is a Nash Equilibrium of the game [N,M(e ),H]]
4.6 Definition ; a* G m is £f iff for every sequence e C R s.t.
i) is satisfied, there exists a sequence a* CM" s.t. ii) and vi) are
satisfied.
4.7 Definition ; a* G M is P£ iff there exists a sequence of maps n,.,
where n : '^ -> (0,1) and a sequence a* C M° s.t. ii), iv), and
vii) if M('n^) denotes {a G M; for all i, s G z^, a(s) >_ "0^.(3 )}
then a* G M(ri ), and for all i G N, and for each
t t ' *
T^ e M^(nj.), EAa*) > H^([a*|T^]).
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4.8 Definition : a* G M is Ph iff for every sequence n of maps satis-
fying iv), there exists a sequence a* C M" s.t. ii) and vii) are sat-
isfied.
Now that we have all these definitions, it is of some interest to
know what the relations between them are. Essentially Pa = Pe; Pb = Pf
;
Pc = Pg; and Pd = Ph. Moreover, ?d f Vh t Pa f Pc.
When we consider notions of properness, the crucial element is a
metric on the space of strategies, so that we can be precise about what
constitutes a small mistake. For example, in Myerson's original defi-
nition, this metric can be derived from the payoff function. The var-
ious pure strategies, a. of player i are ranked according to H (a ,y, .),
where p denotes the intended n-tuple of mixed strategies. We can define
a metric d: S.xM^.. * R , which we write d(a, |iix.-.) to indicate that it
is a metric on Z
.
, and that the dependence on P/.n is parametric, as
follows:
d(a^lu^)) = [max H^^'f
.t'(i)) 1 ~
^i^'^i'^^d)^
^^i
The "distance" being measured is the distance of the given pure strategy
from the best response: the "size of the mistake". If we are given
any other "distance" d*: E. > R, which measures how far a particular
pure strategy is from the best response, we can construct a properness
concept by requiring that the probability with which a given pure
strategy is used be dominated by f°d*(a), where f is a monotonic de-
creasing function f: R > (0,1], with f(0) = 1. If we consider a se-
quence of such functions, f
,
which converge (in some suitable sense)
to the function f* given by:
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iff d >
f*(d) =
1 if d =
then we have the makings of a proper properness notion.
4.9 Definition: d*: E.xM,.« > R. is a proper distance iff
1. 1 (i) + -—
[oe S^, ae argraax
^^('^.^^(i)) 1
**
^'^i^'^'^ (i)^ " °^' ^"^
C '^ Li t
1
d. = ~sup{d*(T,p): T S z., \i £ M, ,} is attained and is finite, each i.
4.10 Definition ; A family of functions {f : t = l,...,f : R^ + (0,1]}
is said to be admissible iff
i) f^(0) = 1, all t;
ii) f is monotone decreasing, all t;
iii) t > t' *> f'^(d) < f'^'(d) for all d > 0;
iv) lira f = f* [see above]
t->-<=o
The family is said to be strongly admissible if the f are strictly
monotone decreasing for all t. Obviously, the admissibility of a family
depends on the convergence notion used in 4.10.iv.
4.11 Definition ; Let a proper distance, d, and a member f of an ad-
missible family of functions be given. An n-tuple, u ^ M° of mixed
strategies is said to comprise an f -proper equilibrium w.r.t. d_ iff
for each i, and each a. ^ Z.,
1 1
An n-tuple p* ^ M of mixed strategies is said to be a proper equilibrium
w.r.t. a proper distance d iff there exists an admissible family of
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functions {f } and a sequence {\i } CM" of n-tuples of mixed strategies
with the following properties:
i) for each t, \i is an f -proper equilibrium w.r.t. d; and
ii) lim \i^ = u*.
4.12 Remark ; It is clear that a proper equilibrium w.r.t. the distance
d(a |p. .) defined on the previous page is precisely a proper equili-
brium in the sense of Def. 3.11. The following theorem shows that this
is not a vacuous concept.
4.13 Theorem ; Let [N,E,h] be a normal form game where the pure strategy
spaces are finite. Then for any proper distance d there exists a proper
equilibrium w.r.t. d.
Proof ; We begin by showing that for each t there exists an f -proper
equilibrium w.r.t. d. Let M^ = (u^ ^ M^; y^(a) > f*^(d^^), all a€ E^} . .
It is immediate that M = x m. is a compact subset of M°, and is non-
i€N ^
^ ^
empty. We now define a correspondence f ; II •> M by
"y^Cy) = {p^eMj: p^(a) € [f^(d^),f''(d^(a,ia^^^))], all aS S^}
Since the pure strategy spaces are finite, this mapping is upper semi-
continuous, and, being the set of solutions to a finite set of linear
inequalities, is closed- and convex-valued. Hence the mapping f has
a fixed point, which is obviously an f -proper equilibrium w.r.t. d.
The final step is that, since M is a compact set, the sequence of fixed
points has a limit, which is a proper equilibrium w.r.t. d.
4.14 Remark : We can relax the finiteness condition, as long as we
restrict attention to distances and admissible families which preserve
the uppersemicontinuity and convex-valuedness of the correspondence.
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It is also evident that the proper equilibrium w.r.t. any proper
distance d form a subset of the set of trembling-hand perfect equili-
bria. Finally, if we are given two distances d and d' with the property
that d is a monotone increasing transformation of d', then the set of
proper equilibria w.r.t. d coincides with the set of proper equilibria
w.r.t. d'. To see this, if g°d = d' and if f is an admissible family
that works for d', then f "g is an admissible family that works for d.
B. Relations between the various notions defined so far
We begin by recapitulating the perfectness concepts used up to
now.
PI: subgame perfection for single-vertex subgaraes (Selten)
P2: subgame perfection for all subgames (Cave)
P3: trembling-hand perfection in the normal form (Selten)
P4: properness (Myerson)
P5: perfection (Selten)
We further remark that P3 perfection has four different definitions,
depending on whether we require convergence for one or all sequences
of minimum weights, and whether these weights are uniform or can be
varied for each player and each strategy. However, for the purposes
of the present classification we shall stick to the definition given
in Def. 3.9 above.
4.15 Theorem ; The following implications characterize the various
perfection notions given above.
P6 => P5 =» P3 => P2 => PI
P4 => P3 => P2 =» PI
None of the converse implications holds.
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Proof: We begin be remarking that P6 is properness in the agent-normal
form of an extensive form game of perfect recall. Thus it is clear that
P6 =* P5: the reasoning is that used in establishing P4 => P3. It is
also obvious that P2 =» PI, since the former requires local equilibrium
at a strictly larger set of subgames. The fact that P5 is the same as
P3 applied to the agent-normal form shows that P5 => P3. Finally, the
same argument Selten used to establish P3 =* PI shows that P3 =* P2; P2
invokes a richer set of subgames, but the strategic choices are still
richer in the normal form, where mixed strategies can be employed.
To show that the converses are false, we present a series of
examples.
4.16 Examples :
A. PI f P2: consider the following game in extensive form: (p^,c>\
X
There are equilibria at which player 1 chooses "top" at I^^ and "bottom"
at I"*", if player 2 threatens to play "bottom" at I . This threat would
not be considered credible in the subgame defined by I„ but since this
is not considered a subgame in the sense of PI, perfection for these
equilibria ia possible. According to P2, however, the only perfect
equilibrium involves player 2 playing "top" at I^, while player 1 plays
2 1
"top" at I and "bottom" at I , giving each player a payoff of 4-3p.
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S. P2 ;'» P5: consider the following three-player gaae
The nonaal form is given by:
Tt
Tb
Bt
Bb
(1.3,0)
(1,3,0)
(0,0,0)
(0,0,0)
^2
(2,0,0)
(0,0,5)
(0,0,0)
(0,0,0)
(1,3,0)
(1,3,0).
(3,0,3)
(3,0,3)
2
(2,0,0)
(4,4,0)
(3,0,3)
(3,0,3)
The agent normal form is described as follows: the agents of player 1
choose the rows as indicated, while 2 and 3 choose the columns.
T (1,1,3,0) (2,2,0,0) (1,1,3,0) (2,2,0.0)
B (0,0,0,0) (0,0,0,0) (3,3,0,3) (3,3,0,3)
T (1,1,3,0) (0,0,0,5) (1,1,3,0) (4,4,4,0)
B (0,0,0,0) (0,0,0,0) (3,3,0,3) (3,3,0,3)
Since this game has no subgames, either in the PI or P2 sense, it
follows that the sets of equilibria, PI perfect equilibria, and P2
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perfect equilibria are all identical. Since this is a fairly compli-
cated game, we shall focus on particular pure-strategy equilibria. In
the normal form, the strategies Bt and Bb are identical, so when we
analyze this game we can specify normal-form strategies as
[(Pl.Po)' ^» ^]> where p^^ is the probability of Tt, p^ ^^ ^^^ prob-
ability of Tb, q is the probability of L , and r is the probability
of L_. Thus the payoff functions can be written:
H ( ) = p^[3r-q-l] + P2[4qr-3q-r+l] + 3[l-r]
H^C ) = q[3p^-p2+4p2r] + 4p2[l-r]
H^C ) = r[3p2-5p2q+3p^-3] + 3[l-p^-p2]
The best response functions are given by:
Bi(q,r) =
^(1,0) if X > max[0,y]
(0,1) if y > max[0,x]
(0,0) if > max[x,y]
(p,l-p) if X = y >
V,(p^,P2) if X = y =
where x = 3r-q-l, and y = 4qr-3q-r+l
,(p,r) =
^ 1 if 3p^ > P2(l-4r)
q if 3p^ = P2(l-4r)
VO if 3p^ < P2(l-4r)
33(p,q) =
^1 if 3(l-p^) > P2(8-5q)
r if 3(l-p^) = P2(8-5q)
^0 if 3(l-pp < p^^3_3^^
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We observe that there are four pure-strategy equilibria: [(1,0), 1,1];
[(0,1), 1,1]; [(0,0), 0,0]; and [(0,0), 1,0]. All of these are PI and P2
perfect. To verify that [(0,0), 1,0] is P3 perfect, we make use of the
following:
4.17 Lemma ; If p is a P3 perfect equilibrium and if {u } is a sequence
of n-tuples of perturbed-game equilibria that establishes the perfection
of \i, then for each i there exists a T(i) with the property that, for
all t >^ T(i), \i . e A (M , )i^ x). In other words, if player i is allowed
to choose any mixed best response to the perturbed equilibrium of games
sufficiently far out in the sequence, his choice will be the same as at
the limit equilibrium; however, it is certainly not true that this
choice will necessarily be in equilibrium with the choices of the other
players in the perturbed game.
Proof: Linearity of payoff function and convergence of {y }.
Returning to our example, we shall construct a sequence of com-
pletely mixed minimum probability assignments by stipulating that v
is a sequence of small positive constants depending only on t. That
is, every pure strategy not used in [(0,0), 1,0] is used with prob-
ability V . We assume the v are sufficiently small and converge to
0. Thus we have a sequence of n-tuples of the form [(v ,v ),l-vi ,v ],
to which it is obvious that the pure strategies (0,0) = (p^.p^). 1 = P>
and = r are best replies. Therefore, [(0,0), 1,0] is P3 perfect.
However, it is not P5 perfect. This can be seen from the agent-
normal form of the game: consider any sequence of completely mixed
strategies converging to [0,0,1,0], which is the agent-normal version
2
of [(0,0), 1,0]. When the agent of player 1 at I comes to move he
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knows that both the other agent of player 1 and player 2 made mistakes.
Thus, he faces the following game with player 3: (we show only their
payoffs)
^3 ^3
t (2,0) (2,0)
b (0,5) (4,4)
It is now immediate that if the probability that player 3 will play
Ro (which is what the equilibrium calls for) is sufficiently high,
2
the best response for the agent of player 1 at I is "b", instead of
the "t" called for at the equilibrium in question. We have there-
fore shown that P2 f P5, and also that P3 f P5.
Examples showing that the other reverse implications fail can be
found in referenced works by Myerson and Selten.
4.18 Remarks ; In games of perfect information, all the above concepts
coincide. In games of effectively perfect information and perfect re-
call, P5 is equivalent to P2, where effectively perfect information
means: if i,j ^0 and i ^ j, for any I. € H., I. ^ H.,
[I. •» I-] =^ [I. C D(I.,k), some k].
In words, this says that each player can remember all previous moves
of other personal players, although he need not be able to recall his
own past moves (perfect recall) or those of the chance player. Addi-
tionally, if a game has perfect recall it follows that choices can be
made independently at each information set. One example of such a game
is the so-called standard supergame , which consists of a denumerably
infinite repetition of a normal-form game. Each player is allowed, at
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each play of the stage game, to base his move on the entire previous
history of the game, thus making the game one of perfect recall. How-
ever, since the stage game is a normal-form game, the players all move
simultaneously at each stage, so the supergame fails to have perfect
information. However, the property of perfect recall here is sufficient
to guarantee that each agent of a given player has the same information
in the game as a whole as he does in the subgame that starts with his
actions. Thus, for standard supergames all the perfectness notions
coincide.
C. Extension of P5 perfection to games without perfect recall
It will be recalled that none of the perfectness concepts short of
P5 required perfect recall; the role it plays in P5 is to guarantee that
choices can be made independently at each information set. In games
which fail to have perfect recall, we can still retain the intuition
behind P5 perfection as long as we identify a canonical set of indepen-
dent decision problems for each agent. In this section we provide two
ways of arriving at this canonical form.
I. The Partition Method
Recall that if [N,K,H,h,p] is a game in extensive form, H is a
partition of K into n+2 collections of subsets, denoted Hj^,E,,...,H ,W.
W is the set of endpoints, and M(W) denotes the set of all probability
distributions on W that can be induced by the use of mixed strategies.
We now limit attention to player i's strategies. We shall denote by IT
a partition of H .
.
4.19 Definition : Let II be a partition of S., and v € M. a mixed strat-
egy of player i. We say that v is a Il-strategy iff it can be represented
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as v(p ),..., where the p are elements of II, and where each v(p ) is a
random variable taking values in C(p ), the space of |p [-tuples of pure
moves, one for each information set in p . In other words, a II-strategy
is a mixed strategy which may be mixed within elements of H, but which
is constrained to be independent between such elements.
4.20 Examples ; H^ is the coarse (one-element) partition; a Il-strategy
is a mixed strategy; II is the fine partition (each information set is
an element; a n-strategy is a behavioral strategy.
4.21 Definition ; If w(ij) denotes that member of M(W) which results
when the strategy n-tuple y ^ M is employed, and if 5.(11) denotes the
space of player i's H-strategies, we define
*(n) = {w(v.,ii^^^): V. e s^(n), y^^^ e m^^^ = s^^^(n)}
i.e., that subset of M(W) which represents the probability distributions
attainable when player i is restricted to the use of H-strategies.
4.22 Proposition ; n C n' =* $(n) ^ $(n')
Proof ; Since n is coarser than n
'
, the independence requirements on
n' -strategies are weaker than those on Il-strategles; every Il-strategy
is already a Il'-strategy.
4.23 Proposition : *(n) = *(n') = *(n) =» $(n) = *(n.n')-
Proof ; Recall that a necessary and sufficient condition for the hypoth-
esis of the theorem is that moves in any element of K or II' have per-
fect recall w.r.t. moves in other elements. In precise terms, if
u G p e n, and v € p* ^ p, p* € 11, then either
' ' i) there exists no w € W s.t. wnu/05^wnv; or
ii) if, w.l.o.g., D(u) n V ?^ 0, then v C D(u,k), some k.
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Thus, the proposition will be proven if we can show that this property
is inherited by the meet. However, for all p ^ p' , where p and p' are
elements of n^n', either
iii) there exist p, i= p„, elements of II, s.t. u € p v 6 p-; or
iv) there exist p' ^ p', elements of II', s.t. u € p' v € p'
Q.E.D.
4.24 Definition ; n* = .{n: *(n) = $(£)}
By the previous proposition, H* is well-defined; it is the finest
partition whose admissible strategies are equivalent to the use of
mixed strategies, and is equal to II for the case where the player in
question has perfect recall. The elements of this partition are pre-
cisely the independent decision situations faced by the player, and
will serve as the basis for our extension of P5 perfection.
II. The Signalling Method
In an early paper, Thompson (1953) defined the notion of a signalling
strategy for games without perfect recall. The basic idea is that cor-
relation is required, but the extent of this correlation can be limited.
In other words, a player's knowledge of the strategy that he employed at
an earlier information set can be used to reduce his ignorance at a later
date.
4.25 Definition : Let u ^ H. be an information set. u is a signalling
information set iff there exists v ^ H. s.t.
i) V ^ D(u,k) 7^ for some alternative k, and
ii) v n D(u) ^ D(u,k).
The set of signalling information sets is denoted S.. For each u ^ S.,
let E(u) denote the set of v satisfying i) and ii) above.
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4.26 Definition : A pure signalling strategy for player i is a choice
of a nove for each u ^ S.. A mixed signalling strategy is a random
variable taking values in the space of pure signalling strategies.
4.27 Definition ; Let s . be a pure signalling strategy. K(s ) is the
game tree obtained from K when the choices given by s. are assigned to
each uG S , and these information sets are removed from the tree.
5 (s.) denotes the restriction of E to K(s.). The information sets
in E.(s.) will be generically denoted u' . A random variable which takes
values in the space of choices at u' S E.(s ) is called a local be-
havioral strategy at u' ; if 3. consists of a local behavioral strategy,
3.(u'), for each u' £ H.(s.), then 3. is called a behavioral strategy
associated with s.. The pair (a.,B.), where a. is referred to as a
1 11 1
composite strategy .
4.28 Theorem (Thompson, 1953, Prop. 3): To every mixed strategy there
corresponds an equivalent mixed strategy.
4.29 Definition : u R v if either u e E(v) or v 6 E(u); u 'V' v iff there
exists a chain u = u, ,...,u = v s.t. u, R u,^ for all k = l,...,m-l.
Clearly, '^ is an equivalence relation.
4.30 Definition : 11^ = H /'v-
4.31 Remarks : Since choices at u are correlated with choices at mem-
bers of E(u), the equivalence relation defined above associates infor-
mation sets which are necessarily correlated. The elements of the
partition H^ correspond to "agents" defined as follows:
4.32 Definition : Let 11 be a partition of E. into sets p , .... If we
denote by H the set of moves at p (|p [-tuples of moves; one for each
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u € p ) , we can' ascertain whether or not moves at H satisfy the con-
dition of perfect recall with respect to moves at H
,
, t 5* t'. If they
do, for all H , we call H an agent partition of H . . This is not quite
enough for our purposes, however, since we need to obtain the finest
such partition. However, by examining the proof of 4.23, it is clear
that such a finest partition exists, and is equal to II*. Moreover, it
is clear that
4.33 Proposition ; 11* = IT^.
The remaining step, now that we have constructed the canonical form
of the game, is to extend Selten's notion of (P5) perfection to this
canonical form. However, since the canonical form describes a game with
perfect recall, this can be done either by requiring that each agent
play a local best response at H
,
or by looking at trembling-hand per-
fection in the "agent normal form" obtained using the agents defined
in 4.32.
We remark that the same existence proofs used by Selten to show that
P5 equilibria exist work here, so that this is not' a vausous concept.
In our next note, we shall apply this concept to some examples of games
without perfect recall, in particular, to supergames played under
memory limitations.
Footnote :
That this result fails in case ())(n) jt ^(U) is shown in the follow-
ing example, suggested by Charles Blair.
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There are three 2-element partitions:
n-*" = (n^'a^)(n^); J[^ = (u^u^Xu^); n = (u2U2)(u^)
VJe shall show that (J)(n^) = (j)(n"^) ^ (})(n^.n"^) = (j)(II_)
2 3 2
a) (}i(II ) = !j>(n ) a n -strategy is
((lj^,^2''^3'^^ where q^ = pr (T^T^)
^2 = P^ ^V3)
q3 = pr (3^X3)
r = pr (T^)
1 1 n3 . . .,1111.analogously, a n -strategy is (q^.q-jqojr )
where q^ = pr (T^T^)
q^ = pr (T2B3)
q3' = pr (B2T3)
r^ = pr (T^)
The realization probabilities for the various endpoints are:
n2 ii3
pr(a) (ci^+q2)r (q^+q2)r
pr(b) q^Cl-r) 1 1
•^3 "
pr(c) q2(l-r) ,"1 1 1 In 1(l-q^-q2-q3)r
pr(d)
^3^^ q^l-.^
pr(e) (l-q.-q^-q3)r 4a-rh
pr(f) (l-q^-q^-•q3)(l-r) (l-qJ-q^Xl-r^)
equating the realization probabilities for each endpoint, we see that
there is a unique solution:
I4- 1 1
l-q-^-q2-q3
r = q^+q2 q2 = r (
^ ^
)
l-qi-q2
11 1
r q3 1 ''l
^1 = 71-1 ^3 = ^^-^ ) ^iri:^
i-qi-q2 • qi+qo
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2 3
which shows equivalence of 11 and II
b) *(n^) ?^ <i>(n^ . n^): n^ . n^ = (u^)(u2)(u3)
2 2 3
so if <i)(ll ) = '1>(II <, n ) we would be able to find (q,,q2>q3>r) s.t.
qgr = a^(q^+q2)r =
"l
q^(l-r) = ^'2
q2(l-r) = a3
5
for any a. s.t. r a < 1
i=l ^
However, it is easy to see t
'^1 "5
(l-q^-q2-q3)r = 05
(l-q-|!-q2~q3)(l~i^) = 1-a 2^-a 2"Tx 3-a ^-a 5
—
,
-
,
.an additional constraint on the a.'s.
V"3 i-vWV"5 ^
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